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Abstract 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (“OCC”) 
FinTech charter is an attempt by a U.S. financial regulator to 
grapple with emerging technologies in financial services in a 
meaningful way, and while this comment does not come to any 
conclusions as to whether the OCC's framework is correct, this 
comment does argue that the FinTech charter would enable 
companies to circumvent the requirements of the Bank Holding 
Company Act (“BHCA”).  Despite the OCC initially suggesting that 
the BHCA could apply to FinTech companies chartered as special 
purpose national banks (“SPNBs”), it is clear that these 
entities do not and cannot meet the definition of a bank under 
the BHCA because FinTech SPNBs are not permitted to take 
deposits.  Furthermore, the industry that the charter is 
actually targeting, marketplace lending, does not take deposits 
and instead relies on other sources of funding.  Therefore, the 
parent companies of FinTech SPNBs can offer financial services 
and avail themselves of the rights and benefits of a national 
bank without complying with the BHCA.  This comment argues that 
FinTech SPNBs should be subject to the BHCA because an analysis 
of marketplace lending reveals that including the industry in 
the statutory definition of a bank would serve the BHCA’s 
underlying policy rationales.  
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I. Introduction 
From mobile banking and artificial intelligence to Big 
Tech, technology is changing the way financial services are 
reaching consumers, and U.S. financial regulators are struggling 
to keep pace.  In 2016, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”) attempted to bring financial innovations 
under the federal regulatory regime by announcing the agency’s 
exploration into special purpose national bank (“SPNB”) charters 
for financial technology (“FinTech”) companies.1  The agency 
proceeded with its proposal in 2018, announcing it would begin 
accepting applications for such charters, publishing an update 
to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual in July 2018.2 
 
1 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE 
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 2 (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-
examination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-
nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf (introducing the idea of a FinTech 
charter). 
2 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING 
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES 1 (2018) (establishing that FinTech companies may be 
eligible for a national bank charter and explaining how FinTech 
charter applications might be evaluated).  
 2 
The July 2018 Licensing Manual Supplement made clear that 
the only FinTech companies who could apply for the charter were 
those who did not take deposits.3  Yet the OCC’s white paper from 
December 2016 suggested that the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 (“BHCA”) could apply to companies that own FinTech SPNBs if 
the SPNB meets the definition of a bank under the statute.4  
However, in order to meet the definition of a bank under the 
BHCA, the institution must either be FDIC-insured or take 
deposits and make commercial loans.5  Because of the OCC’s own 
requirement that depository institutions cannot apply for the 
 
3 See id. at 2 (stating that the FinTech charter is intended only 
for institutions that do not take deposits). 
4 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 7 (“If 
a fintech company interested in operating as a special purpose 
national bank has or plans to have a holding company that would 
be the sole or controlling owner of the bank . . . the BHCA 
could apply.”). 
5 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (providing the seminal 
definition of a bank under the BHCA as an institution that is 
either FDIC-insured or both accepts deposits and makes 
commercial loans).  
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FinTech charter, parent companies of FinTech SPNBs would be, by 
definition, excluded from application of the BHCA.6 
To demonstrate this issue, imagine a hypothetical FinTech 
company:  a marketplace lender, FastCash, Inc.  FastCash is a 
large direct lender that relies on market funding to make loans 
to its customers via its online website.  Customers need only 
fill out an application online before receiving a credit 
decision, which FastCash makes using its proprietary 
underwriting algorithm.  FastCash only makes consumer loans; 
that is, extensions of credit to a person rather than a 
business.  To avoid the costly and burdensome state-by-state 
licensing system, FastCash applies for and receives an SPNB 
charter, thus entitling it to all the rights and benefits of a 
federally-regulated national bank. 
Imagine also a large technology and e-commerce company—
Abracadabra, Inc.—that offers a variety of services in addition 
 
6 See Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech: The OCC’s Newest 
Nonbank Proposal, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1393, 1426 (2018) (arguing 
the OCC should not be allowed to charter non-depository 
institutions because doing so would enable parent companies of 
such institutions to avoid the BHCA). 
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to its e-commerce platform, including big data analytics.7  To 
facilitate its e-commerce business and make use of its data 
analytics arm, Abracadabra seeks to acquire FastCash to offer 
lending services to its customers.  FastCash is not a bank for 
the purposes of the BHCA because it neither accepts deposits nor 
is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”).  Abracadabra can thus obtain the benefits of a 
nationally-chartered entity without being subject to the BHCA. 
The history of the BHCA tracks a game of cat-and-mouse, in 
which industry players construct innovative business models to 
avoid triggering the statute, while Congress attempts to 
undercut opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by amending the 
statutory text.8  If there is a loophole in the FinTech charter 
 
7 See generally Dan Murphy, Big Tech’s Invasion of Banking, MILKEN 
INST. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-
techs-invasion-of-banking (discussing the threat of Big Tech 
companies seeking to enter the financial services industry),bh 
8 See generally Saule T. Omarova & Tahyar E. Margaret, That Which 
We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company 
Regulations in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 
(2012) (providing a detailed history of the development of the 
BHCA and the changing definition of a bank as a result of 
industry exploiting loopholes). 
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that undermines the underlying policy objectives of the BHCA, 
then undoubtedly FinTech SPNBs should also be tethered to the 
BHCA’s requirements like other FDIC-insured national banks.9  If, 
however, applying the BHCA to the parent companies of FinTech 
SPNBs would not serve any underlying policy objective, then 
there is no legal conundrum.10  Ultimately, whether the BHCA 
should apply to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs is a 
question of the extent to which it would serve the statute’s 
underlying policy rationales. 
The question that this comment seeks to answer is:  should 
the BHCA apply to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs?  
Through the lens of the marketplace lending industry, this 
comment argues that subjecting the parent companies of FinTech 
SPNBs would serve the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales and, 
therefore, the BHCA should apply.  This comment also proposes a 
framework by which to analyze the applicability of the BHCA.  
 
9 See id. at 159–68 (exemplifying how an exemption from the BHCA 
precipitated the rapid growth of the industrial loan company 
industry). 
10 See id. at 172 (explaining that credit card banks were first 
implicitly, and then explicitly, exempted from the definition of 
a bank under the BHCA because there was no interstate banking 
risk or monopolization of commercial credit risk).  
 6 
Section II of this comment provides an introduction to the OCC 
FinTech charter, the marketplace lending industry, and the BHCA.  
Section III proposes a framework to analyze the BHCA’s 
applicability and applies that framework to our hypothetical 
marketplace lender, FastCash.  Section IV recommends a solution 
in the form of a statutory amendment from Congress that would 
incorporate FinTech SPNBs in the definition of a bank. 
II. The FinTech Charter and the BHCA 
 FinTech is difficult to define and there is no universally-
accepted definition.11  Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines 
FinTech as “products and companies that employ newly developed 
digital and online technologies in the banking and financial 
services industries.”12  The types of technologies are broad and 
include products such as marketplace lending, mobile banking, 
mobile payments, crowdfunding, cryptocurrency, automated 
 
11 See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edges, 93 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 78-9 (2018) (advocating for a broad 
definition of financial technology). 
12 Fintech, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fintech (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).  
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investing, and other digitized assets and services.13  The rise 
of FinTech, particularly marketplace lending, accelerated 
following the financial crisis of 2008, when access to lines of 
credit dried up and made it exceedingly difficult for consumers 
and small businesses to obtain short-term, small-dollar loans.14  
Consequently, the FinTech industry is generally seen as a 
product of the growing 21st-century digital economy, and a new 
challenge for financial regulators tasked with ensuring the 
safety and soundness of the markets and their participants.15  In 
2018, the OCC attempted to provide greater regulatory clarity 
 
13 See, e.g., Jackson Mueller, Bipartisan Opportunities to 
Legislate U.S. FinTech in the 21st Century, MILKEN INSTITUTE 9 
(2018) (tabulating the various sectors of the financial 
technology industry). 
14 See DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING: 
FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING 1 (2018) (discussing the 
rapid growth of the marketplace lending industry); see also 
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation 
Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 268 (analyzing how online lenders 
have filled the gaps in access to credit).   
15 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing FinTech as a new 
development in market trends); see id. at 26 (noting FinTech 
presents regulatory challenges).  
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for FinTech companies that pay checks or make loans, but do not 
take deposits, in the form of a proposed FinTech charter.16 
A. Introducing the OCC FinTech Charter 
The FinTech charter was the result of a long-term multi-
stakeholder effort beginning in August 2015 to study financial 
innovation and develop an appropriate regulatory framework.17  In 
March 2016, the agency capitalized on its work by publishing its 
first white paper on the principles of regulating financial 
innovation.18  A few months later, the OCC established the Office 
of Innovation and, not long after, announced in December 2016 
that it would begin exploring SPNB charters for FinTech 
 
16 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BEGINS ACCEPTING 
NATIONAL BANK CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (July 
31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html (announcing the agency would 
begin accepting applications for national bank charters from 
FinTech companies).  
17 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 3 
(summarizing the progress of the OCC’s innovation initiative). 
18 See id. (highlighting the white paper released in March 2016 
in which the OCC discussed regulation of financial innovation, 
including FinTech).  
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companies.19  In the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual Supplement, 
the agency defines an SPNB as “a national bank that engages in a 
limited range of banking or fiduciary activities . . . .”20  In 
the case of the FinTech charter, these activities are limited 
paying checks or lending money.21   
According to the OCC, an SPNB charter for FinTech would: 
(1) “provide[] a framework of uniform standards”; (2) “level the 
playing field with regulated institutions”; and (3) “help 
promote consistency in the application of laws and regulations 
across the country . . . .”22  The FinTech charter provides a 
nationalized solution to the current state-by-state licensing 
 
19 See id. at 2–3 (summarizing the agency’s findings and 
discussing the creation and establishment of the OCC’s Office of 
Innovation).  
20 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2.  
21 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2015) (“A special purpose bank 
that conducts activities other than fiduciary activities must 
conduct at least one of the following three core banking 
functions:  Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending 
money.”).  
22 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS 2 
(2018).  
 10 
system.23  The present regulatory framework can be quite 
burdensome for FinTech companies, particularly marketplace 
lenders, who are required to comply with the varying, and 
sometimes conflicting, state licensing requirements.24  The OCC 
aimed to provide greater certainty and clarity for the industry 
through the creation of FinTech SPNBs that have the same rights 
and requirements as national banks.25  According to the OCC, a 
FinTech company chartered as an SPNB has the same rights as any 
other chartered national bank.26  This special status affords 
SPNBs certain benefits, notably federal preemption under the 
National Bank Act and the OCC’s regulations.27 
 
23 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining how fintech 
companies are regulated at the state level).  
24 See id. at 15 (discussing the various state licensing 
requirements and which companies or industries are required to 
obtain licenses). 
25 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (“In 
general, a special purpose national bank is subject to the same 
laws, regulations, examination, reporting requirements, and 
ongoing supervision as other national banks.”). 
26 See id. (describing further the benefits that a FinTech SPNB 
can obtain by virtue of becoming a chartered national bank).  
27 See id. (discussing the dual-banking preemption system. 
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 The FinTech charter has been caught up in litigation since 
2016, when the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) and 
New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) first 
filed lawsuits challenging the charter.28  While the CSBS case 
was dismissed for lack of ripeness, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York entered judgment in October 
2019 in favor of NYDFS, effectively blocking the OCC from 
issuing any charters to FinTech companies.29  The OCC appealed 
the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
 
28 See Complaint at 5, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. 
OCC, 313 F.Supp.3d 285 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17 Civ. 0763) (brining 
a suit against the OCC for declaratory and injunctive relief 
preventing the OCC from chartering FinTech companies); see also 
Complaint at 1, Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574, 2017 WL 6512245, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief challenging the OCC SPNB charter for FinTech 
companies).  
29 See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, No. 18 Civ. 
2449, 2019 WL 4194541, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (dismissing 
the case for lack of ripeness); see also Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18 
Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019) 
(vacating the OCC’s regulation permitting it to charter non-
depository institutions).  
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and, as of April 2020, the case is pending.30  Nonetheless, 
interest in the FinTech charter remains high, particularly among 
the industry that would stand to benefit the most from a 
national regulatory regime:  marketplace lenders.31 
 
30 See Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 
6334895, at *1 (appealing the decision by the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York) ; see also Lacewell 
v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2d Cir. filed Dec. 19, 2019) (filing the 
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); 
see also UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT (Mar. 26, 
2020), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ (extending all filing 
deadlines by 21 days beginning April 6, 2020 due to the COVID-19 
pandemic).  
31 See Kate Rooney, Fintech’s Fast Pass to Traditional Banking is 
Now Cut Off, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/fintechs-fast-pass-to-
traditional-banking-is-now-cut-off.html (pointing out that 
FinTech companies were very interested in the OCC charter).  But 
see Zach A. Pette, It's Harder for Fintechs to Become Banks. And 
That's Good., PAYMENTSSOURCE (Mar. 26, 2020, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/its-harder-for-fintechs-
to-become-banks-and-thats-good (arguing against a national bank 
 
 13 
B. Marketplace Lending 
In simple terms, a marketplace lender is non-banking entity 
that makes loans to consumers and businesses via an online 
platform.32  Customers apply for a loan, typically via the 
marketplace lender’s website, provide access to their bank and 
other accounts, and receive a credit decision almost 
immediately.33  The process is expedited through the use of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence (“AI”) to assess 
alternative, nontraditional data, enabling the program to 
 
charter for FinTech companies but noting many companies, 
including Varo and Square, are eager to obtain the benefits of a 
national bank charter).  
32 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 1–2 (describing the central 
features of marketplace lenders). 
33 See HOW DOES AN ONLINE CREDIT MARKETPLACE WORK?, LENDINGCLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (describing LendingClub’s online 
credit application and securitization); see also HOW IT WORKS, 
ONDECK, https://www.ondeck.com/how-it-works (last visited Apr. 
12, 2020) (summarizing OnDeck’s credit application process for 
potential customers). 
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generate a credit decision within minutes.34  The platform’s use 
of alternative data make marketplace lenders particularly 
accessible to unbanked and underbanked customers who are often 
unable to obtain credit from chartered institutions that use 
more traditional data.35  The growth of the industry is further 
evidence of the popularity of marketplace lenders, who saw a 
global increase in credit originations from $11 billion in 2013 
to $284 billion in 2016.36  In 2019, two of the largest industry 
players in the United States, LendingClub and OnDeck, originated 
almost $15 billion of loans combined.37 
 
34 See Kristin Johnson et al., Symposium: Rise of the Machines: 
Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law: 
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: 
Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 500 (2019) 
(explaining how FinTech lenders use machine learning and AI).  
35 See id. at 528 (discussing the benefits of AI). 
36 Stijn Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the 
World: Size, Drivers and Policy Issues, BIS Q. REV. 33 (2018).  
37 See LendingClub, Form 10-K Annual Report 58 (Feb. 19, 2020) 
(reporting $12.3 billion in loan originations in 2019); see also 
OnDeck, Form 10-K Annual Report 4 (Feb. 28, 2020) (reporting 
$2.5 billion in loan originations in 2019).  
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There are two primary business models by which the 
marketplace lender can extend credit:  (1) the direct lending 
model; and (2) the bank partnership model.38  Under either model, 
the marketplace lender does not take deposits and instead relies 
on the market or its bank partner to fund the loan.39  In the 
direct lending model, the marketplace lender holds the loans on 
its balance sheet and incurs all the credit risk if a borrower 
defaults.40  Direct marketplace lenders generally have to obtain 
a license for every state in which they want to do business, 
which can discourage companies from pursuing the direct lending 
model.41 
 
38 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 2–3 (describing the marketplace 
lending business models and noting that the direct lending model 
is also referred to as the balance-sheet lending model); see 
also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 87–88 
(2018) (discussing the lending models). 
39 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 11 (noting marketplace lenders 
do not rely on deposits). 
40 See id. at 3 (describing the direct lending model, which is 
also referred to as the balance-sheet lending model). 
41 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 87–88 
(discussing the direct lending model).  
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In the bank partnership model, the marketplace lender 
relies on a state- or nationally-chartered bank to originate the 
loan, which the marketplace lender then buys back and services 
for the borrower.42  Another version of this model, referred to 
as “peer-to-peer” or “P2P” lending, connects prospective 
investors with loans that match their risk tolerance and desired 
rate of return.43  Once a match is made and the investor has 
committed to funding the loan, the partner bank originates the 
loan and sells it to the marketplace lender, who in turn sells 
the loan to investors in the form of a note.44   
The bank partnership model is often referred to as a “rent-
a-charter” or “rent-a-bank” scheme because the marketplace 
 
42 See id. at 88 (discussing the bank partnership model); see 
also Perkins, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining how the bank 
partnership model functions).  
43 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88 
(discussing the P2P lending model); see also Perkins, supra note 
14, at 4 (illustrating the P2P lending model). 
44 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88 
(detailing the funding strategy in the peer-to-peer funding 
model); see also Perkins, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining the 
securitization process in the peer-to-peer lending model, also 
known as the indirect funding model).  
 17 
lender pays the partner bank to originate the loan and, in 
exchange, obtains the same legal protections and preemption 
benefits afforded to that institution for that loan.45  This 
model can be particularly beneficial for a marketplace lender 
seeking to avoid state usury caps because, under Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,46 
the loan originated by the partner bank is valid so long as it 
complies with the usury laws of the state in which the bank is 
located.  However, a Second Circuit decision from 2015 
eviscerated this arrangement by holding that third-party debt 
buyers cannot avail themselves of the partner bank’s federal 
preemption of state usury caps.47  Consequently, the benefits of 
 
45 See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining the legal 
challenges that rent-a-charter schemes face, particularly when 
considering who the true lender is).   
46 439 U.S. 299, 313 (1978) (holding that a bank may charge its 
out-of-state customers the interest that is permissible in the 
state where the bank is located).  
47 See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2015) 
(holding that third-party debt buyer partners of national banks 
cannot preempt state usury caps under the National bank Act).  
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the “rent-a-charter” structure are waning, making the OCC’s 
FinTech charter all the more appealing.48 
C. The Bank Holding Company Act:  A History of a Statute 
Under Siege  
The BHCA regulates the parent companies of entities that 
meet the definition of a bank under the statute.49  These bank 
holding companies (“BHCs”) are subject to enhanced regulation 
and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(“Board”).50  Specifically, there are a number of requirements 
that a company must meet before becoming a BHC, such as 
requesting pre-approval by the Board before acquiring any bank 
or any additional bank.51  The Board also restricts the 
 
48 See Joseph B. Sconyers et al., OCC Fintech Charter Headed to 
the Second Circuit, JONES DAY (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/01/occ-fintech-
charter-headed-to-the-second-circuit (contending that the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Madden v. Midland “raised existential 
questions” for fintech companies and made the prospect of a 
national bank charter more appealing). 
49 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2018).  
50 See id. § 1844 (requiring BHCs to register with the Board and 
authorizing the Board to regulate BHCs). 
51 Id. §§ 1842(a), 1843(j)(1), (4), (5). 
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permissible activities of the non-banking subsidiaries of BHCs 
to those that are “so closely related to banking or managing or 
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto . . . .”52   
The BHCA was initially enacted for two primary and 
interrelated purposes:  (1) to prevent the monopolization of 
commercial credit; and (2) to restrict the interstate expansion 
of bank branches.53  The enactment of the groundbreaking 
legislation was the result of an uptick in banks forming BHCs as 
a means to subvert state banking regulations restricting 
interstate branching.54  The drafters of the BHCA feared this 
trend would lead to the rise of a “national banking empire.”55  
Nonetheless, following the BHCA’s passage in 1956, the policy 
focus shifted from the two above rationales to the separation of 
 
52 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2019).  
53 See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2–7 (1955) (outlining the reasons 
for the BHCA, including combatting the growing number of BHCs 
seeking to take advantage of out-of-state markets); see also 
Omarova, supra note 8, at 119 (summarizing the two underlying 
rationales for the BHCA).  
54 See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 4 (detailing the expansion of BHCs 
across state lines).  
55 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 120 (citing Note, The Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, 75 BANKING L.J. 277, 293 (1958)).  
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banking and commerce, reflecting concerns about banks becoming 
too immersed in non-banking activities.56  The three policies for 
the BHCA that Congress put forth can be summarized as:  (1) 
restricting interstate banking; (2) preventing the 
monopolization of commercial credit; and (3) separating banking 
and commerce. 
i. The Evolving Definition of a “Bank” Under the 
BCHA 
Whether an entity qualifies as a bank under the BHCA 
determines the statute’s applicability.  A company that acquires 
a nonbank entity will not be subject to the requirements of the 
BHCA or heightened regulation by the Board.57  The definition of 
a bank under the BHCA is the product of numerous amendments 
between 1956, when the statute was enacted, and 1987, when the 
definition of a bank was most recently amended.58  Congress 
acknowledged that the BHCA as originally enacted was not 
 
56 See id. at 124 (demonstrating the shift in focus to the 
separation of banking and commerce). 
57 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018). 
58 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 138–39 (noting that Congress 
amended the definition of a bank under the BHCA three times).  
 21 
intended to contemplate all the issues and risks posed by BHCs.59  
Yet, because the statute was not comprehensive, this gave rise 
to loopholes.60  As the BHCA’s legislative history demonstrates, 
for every amendment to the statute, there was a corresponding 
increase in institutions seeking to take advantage of newly-
created loopholes.61     
The 1966 Amendments to the BHCA redefined a bank as “any 
institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal 
right to withdraw on demand . . . .”62  Congress narrowed the 
original 1956 definition realizing that restricting the 
application of the BHCA to depository institutions could still 
serve the underlying objective of restraining the concentration 
of commercial credit.63  Congress viewed it as unnecessary to 
apply the BHCA to companies that owned savings banks and thus 
 
59 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-534, at 3 (1965) (stating the BHCA was not 
intended to anticipate all possible problems).  
60 See id. at 3–4 (closing the loophole for trusts). 
61 See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 8, at 151–52 (discussing the 
growing number of acquisitions of nonbank banks in the 1980s, 
exploiting a loophole in an older version of the BHCA). 
62 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236, 236 (1966).  
63 S. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).  
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applied the statute only to institutions that accepted demand 
deposits.64  However, the 1966 Amendments enabled holding 
companies to sidestep the requirements of the BHCA by ensuring 
that the institutions under their control did not accept what 
would legally be considered demand deposits.65   
In 1970, Congress again amended the definition of a bank to 
“any institution . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the 
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) 
engages in the business of making commercial loans.”66  The 1970 
definition of a bank restricted the BHCA’s application to only 
those institutions engaged in commercial and not consumer 
 
64 See id. (providing that the “commonly accepted test” for 
whether an institution is a commercial bank is whether it 
accepts demand deposits).  
65 See id. (maintaining that the 1966 Amendments opened the door 
to holding companies that could control both commercial and de 
facto banking subsidiaries so long as these entities did not 
take demand deposits).  
66 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970).  
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lending.67  This change, in effect, allowed any company to obtain 
control of an FDIC-insured institution that both accepted 
deposits and made consumer loans without implicating the BHCA.68  
This so-called “nonbank bank” loophole rapidly proliferated 
given that companies could own banks without being subject to 
the restrictions of the BHCA.69   
Viewing this trend as a major threat to the separation of 
banking and commerce, Congress closed the nonbank bank loophole 
in the Competitive Equality Banking Act (“CEBA”) of 1987 by 
amending the definition of a bank to its current version: 
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.  (B) An institution . . 
. which both—(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits 
that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar 
means for payment to third parties or others; and (ii) 
 
67 See S. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 24 (discussing the Board’s concerns 
that the 1966 Amendments made the definition of a bank too 
broad).  
68 See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 2 (1987) (discussing the rise of the 
nonbank bank loophole).  
69 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 150 (expanding upon the creation 
of the nonbank bank loophole).  
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is engaged in the business of making commercial 
loans.70 
 
CEBA also included a number of exceptions from the 
definition of a bank, specifically excluding foreign banks, 
trust banks, credit unions, credit card banks, industrial loan 
companies (ILCs), and savings banks.71  The exceptions to the 
definition of a bank under the BHCA shed light on the statute’s 
underlying policy rationales, providing some guidance as to when 
Congress will apply the BHCA to a particular type of entity.  
ii. The BHCA’s Policy Rationales 
Prior to the BHCA’s enactment in 1956 and in order to 
protect small community banks, a number of states imposed 
restrictions on banks’ abilities to expand across state 
borders.72  In response, several entities began to form BHCs 
because it enabled them to own banks from different states while 
 
70 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 
§ 101(a), 101 Stat. 552, 554 (1987); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) 
(2018). 
71 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 101(a); 12 U.S.C. § 
1841(c)(2). 
72 See Omarova, supra note 7, at 120–21 (discussing the 
interstate banking rationale).  
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avoiding restrictions on interstate banking.73  States and local 
bankers grew concerned that the growing number of BHCs 
threatened the ability of community banks to operate in the 
commercial credit market.74  The BHCA was thus born from the two 
harmonious policy rationales of (1) restricting interstate 
banking and (2) preventing excessive concentration of commercial 
credit.75  Nevertheless, market and economic realities made these 
two objectives less feasible.76  Interstate banking restrictions 
simply fell out of favor while resistance to the monopolization 
of commercial credit faded as more banks consolidated and merged 
with each other “in search for . . . economies of scale . . . 
.”77  Instead, policymakers grew more concerned with the 
intermingling of banking and commerce.78 
Separating banking and commerce has been a long-standing 
principle of U.S. financial regulation, and it has evolved over 
 
73 Id. at 121. 
74 Id. at 122. 
75 Id. at 120. 
76 Id. at 123 n.33. 
77 Id. at 123–24. 
78 Id. at 124. 
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time.79  Beginning in the 1860s, the National Bank Act of 1864 
provided for a limited set of core banking powers.80  The 
separation of banking and commerce was then formally codified 
into law with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which limited the 
activities that banks could engage in, specifically prohibiting 
banks from dealing in or underwriting securities.81  However, 
banks were still permitted to affiliate with purely commercial 
firms.82  The most meaningful change came in 1956 with the BHCA, 
 
79 See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 
710, 794 (2017) (noting the historical significance of the 
separation of banking and commerce in banking law).  See 
generally Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and 
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481 (providing a history of 
the separation of banking and commerce in the United States).   
80 See Halpert, supra note 79, at 492 (noting the powers granted 
to banks by the National Bank Act were limited in scope). 
81 See WILLIAM JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 87-352 E, THE SEPARATION 
OF BANKING AND COMMERCE 4 (1987) (discussing the purpose and 
enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act). 
82  Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, 
Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 274 (2013). 
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which finally imposed restrictions on the activities of bank 
affiliates.83 
There are three main arguments in favor of maintaining the 
separation between banking and commerce:  “the needs to preserve 
the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to 
ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive 
economic enterprise, and to prevent excessive concentration of 
financial and economic power in the financial sector.”84  The 
safety and soundness argument has to do with the bank’s exposure 
to risky nonbanking activities as both banks and the deposit 
insurance fund (for depository banks) should not be used to 
prop-up failing commercial affiliates.85  The second argument 
pertains to bias in credit underwriting, as banks affiliated 
with commercial firms may be strongly incentivized “to make 
important lending decisions on the basis of such decisions’ 
potential impact on their commercial affiliates’ financial 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 275. 
85 See id. at 275–76 (discussing the problems with allowing 
commercial businesses to benefit from the deposit insurance fund 
through their bank affiliates). 
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condition or profitability.”86  Lastly, the third prong relates 
to the potential for banks and commercial firms to merge and 
form large financial conglomerates to the exclusion of small 
businesses and businesses not affiliated with a bank.87 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”), which both partially repealed Glass-Steagall and 
created a new financial entity:  the financial holding company 
(“FHC”).88  FHCs are able to engage in a broader range of 
activities that are “financial in nature” or determined to be 
“complementary” to a financial activity.89  While the GLBA did 
not outright repeal the separation of banking and commerce, it 
did make it significantly easier for companies to own a bank 
while also owning other nonbank entities.90 
 
86 Id. at 276.  See also S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 8 (1987) (quoting 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker). 
87 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276–77. 
88 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1341 (1999); see also Omarova, supra note 82, at 279 (discussing 
the GLBA).  
89 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2018). 
90 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 126 (contending that the 
principle of the separation of banking and commerce was retained 
before the GLBA was enacted). 
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III. Analyzing the FinTech Charter and the Applicability of the 
BHCA 
The OCC FinTech charter specifically requires that 
marketplace lenders not take deposits, yet allows them to avail 
themselves of all the rights and benefits of becoming a national 
bank.91  Because of this, the FinTech charter is highly desirable 
for marketplace lenders seeking greater regulatory clarity and 
certainty, particularly because of the federal preemption 
benefits.92  Throughout the history of the BHCA, numerous 
entities have sought to take advantage of the BHC structure 
without triggering the statute and thus being subject to 
 
91 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2 
(stating that depository institutions would not qualify for the 
FinTech charter); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
supra note 1, at 5 (stating that SPNBs are subject to the same 
laws and standards as chartered national banks); see also id. 
(establishing the a FinTech SPNB would have the same rights as 
any other nationally-chartered bank). 
92 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 
(noting that SPNBs would be able to avail themselves of the 
preemption benefits available to chartered national banks under 
the National Bank Act and the OCC’s regulations).  
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enhanced regulation by the Board.93  This demonstrates that the 
BHC structure itself is highly desirable as it enables companies 
to consolidate.94  But, as the BHCA is currently written, it 
would not apply to the parent company of a marketplace lender 
because the marketplace lender would not meet the statutory 
definition of a bank.95  An analysis of the BHCA’s explicit and 
implicit underlying policy rationales demonstrates that the BHCA 
 
93 See generally Omarova, supra note 7 (providing a history of 
the definition of a bank under the BHCA, which evolved in 
response to companies seeking to become BHCs without being 
regulated as such under the statute).  
94 See id. at 123–24 (discussing the trend among banks and their 
holding companies to merge, acquire, and consolidate in order to 
take advantage of the benefits that a large financial 
conglomerate has to offer). 
95 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 38 (noting marketplace lenders 
do not take deposits and instead rely on other sources of 
funding); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (defining a 
bank as an institution that takes demand deposits, including 
FDIC-insured institutions).  
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should apply to the parent companies of chartered FinTech SPNBs 
because doing so would serve those rationales.96 
A. Proposing a BHCA Analysis Framework 
Let us return to the case of FastCash, Inc., our 
hypothetical marketplace lender that is now a charted SPNB.  
Recall that Abracadabra, Inc., a technology and e-commerce 
company, is seeking to acquire FastCash in order to offer 
lending services to its customers and, in doing so, it would not 
be subject to the requirements under the BHCA.  But, should it 
be? 
The underlying rationales for the BHCA helped guide 
Congress when determining whether an entity should be considered 
a bank under the statute.97  These policy rationales can be used 
as a framework to analyze whether companies like Abracadabra 
should be subject to the requirements of the BHCA by including 
marketplace lenders, such as FastCash, in the definition of a 
 
96 See generally Omarova, supra note 8 (discussing the changing 
definition of a bank under the BHCA pursuant to the underlying 
policy rationales). 
97 See generally id. (providing a history of the evolution of the 
BHCA due to the underlying policy rationales). 
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bank.98  The first part of the analysis framework encompasses the 
three explicit underlying policy rationales that emerged 
throughout the history of the BHCA: (1) restricting interstate 
banking; (2) preventing the monopolization of commercial credit; 
and (3) separating banking and commerce.99  The second part of 
the analysis framework proposes three new rationales that were 
implicit in the policy decisions underlying the BHCA’ definition 
of a bank:  (1) the availability of a parallel regulatory 
regime; (2) access to the federal safety net; and (3) mitigating 
too-big-to-fail institutions.100 
 
98 See generally id. (demonstrating how Congress created the 
definition of a bank and the exemptions from the definition of a 
bank based on whether doing so served the underlying policy 
rationales). 
99 See id. at 119 (commercial credit and the separation of 
banking and commerce); see also id. (expansion of interstate 
banking).  
100 See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); see also id. at 
151–52 (pointing out that commercial companies who acquire banks 
also acquire cheap funding from the bank’s depositors because 
the deposits are insured by the federal government); see also 
id. at 127 (discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 
 33 
i. Framework Part I:  Explicit Rationales for the 
BHCA 
Over time, restricting interstate banking and preventing 
the excessive concentration of commercial credit faded away as 
the primary policy objectives of the BHCA because the economic 
realities of the financial industry had changed.101  Congress 
ultimately repealed the restrictions on interstate banking under 
the BHCA in 1994, finding the provision no longer useful.102  In 
1987, CEBA further eroded the restrictions against interstate 
banking by codifying an explicit federal preemption of state 
interstate banking laws.103  However, preventing the excessive 
concentration of commercial credit remains a viable, though not 
 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, nonbank systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) are regulated 
similarly to BHCs).  
101 See id. at 122–23 (examining how these two rationales became 
less relevant). 
102 See id. at 123 n.33 (discussing the development and eventual 
repeal of the Douglas Amendment and explaining why the 
restrictions on interstate banking fell out of favor). 
103 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 172 (1987) (Conf. Rep.) 
(explaining the rationale for preempting state laws restricting 
interstate banking as important for bank acquisitions). 
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central, objective of the BHCA.104  This is seen in the 
definition of a bank in the statute itself, which includes 
entities that take demand deposits and make commercial loans, 
demonstrating a focus on commercial credit as opposed to 
consumer credit.105  In addition, CEBA created an exemption from 
the definition of a bank for trust companies, but specifically 
restricted them from making commercial loans.106  Although 
restricting interstate banking is not as essential when 
balancing the various policy rationales supporting the 
applicability of the BHCA, preventing the excessive 
concentration of commercial credit remains relevant.107 
 
104 See generally id. (retaining provisions of the BHCA that 
protect against the monopolization of commercial credit).  
105 See id. at 119–20 (closing the nonbank bank loophole but 
maintaining commercial loans as a key feature of a bank); see 
also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (current statutory definition 
of a bank). 
106 H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 120 (1987) (Conf. Rep.). 
107 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 172 (noting CEBA also exempted 
credit card banks from the statutory definition of a bank 
because these entities were not engaged in commercial lending); 
see also id. at 178 (discussing the credit union exemption, 
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 The importance of these latter two policy rationales pales 
in comparison to the third policy rationale:  separating banking 
and commerce.108  Recall the three reasons Congress chose to 
separate banking and commerce:  (1) ensuring banks’ safety and 
soundness by restricting affiliations with risky, purely-
commercial businesses; (2) preventing bias in credit decisions 
 
which was also justified on the basis that credit unions did not 
impact the commercial credit market); see also id. at 190 
(emphasizing Congress’ concerns about the excessive 
concentration of commercial credit).  
108 See generally Omarova, supra note 82 (providing a thorough 
discussion of the history and importance of separating banking 
and commerce in U.S. financial regulation and providing recent 
examples that demonstrate the conflicts of interest that arise 
from allowing financial institutions to deal in commodities); 
see generally Khan, supra note 79 (analogizing the separation of 
banking and commerce as a kind of antitrust principle and 
explaining why Amazon poses similar risks to the economy as 
banks who affiliate with purely commercial businesses); see 
generally Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and 
Commerce, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 973 (2019) (emphasizing the 
importance of “separation regimes” in other industries, 
including banking).  
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causing banks to prop-up their failing commercial affiliates to 
the detriment of other potential borrowers; and (3) discouraging 
the formation of large financial conglomerates.109  While these 
reasons illuminate why the separation of banking and commerce is 
a priority, the history of the BHCA also demonstrates how that 
separation is continuously undermined by firms seeking to 
exploit loopholes and gain the benefits of owning a bank.110   
ILCs, one of the entities excepted from the definition of a 
bank, are a good example of what happens when an entity is 
exempt from application of the BHCA.111  In 2005, there was 
significant controversy when Wal-Mart attempted to form its own 
ILC in order to offer financial services to its customers.112  
Realizing the implications for the separation of banking and 
commerce, the FDIC subsequently imposed a moratorium on Wal-
Mart’s application for deposit insurance as well as all other 
 
109 Omarova, supra note 82, at 275–76. 
110 See Jackson, supra note 81, at 13–14 (discussing the benefits 
of allowing banks to diversify by affiliating with commercial 
businesses).  
111 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 160 (discussing the ILC 
exception to the definition of a bank under the BHCA). 
112 See id. at 167–69 (providing a history of Wal-Mart’s attempt 
to obtain an ILC).  
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applications by commercial firms seeking ILCs.113  Despite this, 
ILCs continue to benefit from exemption status under the BHCA, 
and the popularity of an ILC charter has not abated.114  Some 
have speculated that Big Tech companies, such as Google, Amazon, 
and Apple, will apply for an ILC charter sometime soon, posing a 
direct threat to the separation of banking and commerce.115 
 
113 See id. at 168 (discussing the FDIC’s moratorium on Wal-
Mart’s application for deposit insurance and the related 
fallout).  See also Scott Coleman & James Kim, FDIC Issues 
Proposed Rule for Approval of ILC Deposit Insurance 
Applications, JD SUPRA (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fdic-issues-proposed-rule-for-
approval-86042/ (discussing the process by which ILCs apply for 
a charter under the relevant state authorities and subsequently 
apply for deposit insurance from the FDIC).  
114 See generally DAVID W. PERKINS,  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11374, 
INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES AND FINTECH IN BANKING (2019) (analyzing the 
increasing popularity of ILC charters among technology companies 
and the implications for the separation of banking and 
commerce).  
115 See id. at 2 (“[O]bservers have speculated that technology 
giants such as Google, Amazon, and Apple might have reason to 
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Congress appears to have legitimate reasons for wanting 
separate banking and commerce, despite disagreement among legal 
scholars, policymakers, and regulators as to whether doing so is 
still a worthwhile goal.116  In reality, these threats create 
 
want a bank charter, possibly including an ILC, in the near 
future.”). 
116 Compare Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of 
Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 400–401 (2012) 
(arguing financial regulators should adjust to the current 
structure of the market rather than pushing for the separation 
of banking and commerce), and Fischel et al., The Regulation of 
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 322 (1987) 
(highlighting the benefits of allowing banks to diversify their 
assets), and Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating 
Banking and Commerce?, AM. BANKER (Jul. 27, 2017, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-are-we-still-
separating-banking-and-commerce (explaining that enabling banks 
to affiliate with nonbank entities can have certain benefits, 
such as diversification, enhanced risk tolerance, increased 
efficiency, and opportunities for capital expansion), with 
Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under 
the Bank Holding Company Act -- A Statutory Objective Under 
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significant conflicts of interest.117  A recent example from the 
early 2010s in which Goldman Sachs utilized its commodities and 
derivatives businesses to profit from its own manipulation of 
aluminum prices underscores the importance of maintaining the 
separation between banking and commerce even in modern times.118  
Returning to our hypothetical marketplace lender, FastCash, and 
Abracadabra, such an acquisition mirrors the more recent trend 
of Big Tech entering financial services; thus, the separation of 
 
Attack, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 184 (1983) (contending that the 
separation of banking and commerce should be strengthened as “an 
essential ingredient of a sound banking system” and to suppress 
the rise of nonbank banks).  
117 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276 (listing the potential 
conflicts of interest that would arise from an intermingling of 
banking and commerce); see also Khan, supra note 108, at 1053 
(stating bias as the drive behind separating banking and 
commerce). 
118 See generally Omarova, supra note 82 (providing a detailed 
history analysis of Goldman Sachs’ commodities business and the 
consequences).  
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banking and commerce should factor heavily into the analysis 
framework.119 
ii. Framework Part II:  Proposed Rationales  
As the BHCA evolved, new policy rationales determining the 
statute’s applicability emerged as both the market and 
regulatory environment changed, particularly following the 
financial crisis of 2008.120  The earliest exemptions to the 
definition of a bank under the BHCA were carved out for credit 
unions and savings and loan associations, or “thrifts.”121  
Congress did not view these entities as banks for the purposes 
of the BHCA, so the companies that own them need not abide by 
the statute’s requirements or apply for approval by the Board.122  
 
119 See BIS, ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 2019 31 (2019) (noting the trend 
among Big Tech companies, including e-commerce platforms, to 
offer lending services to their customers).   
120 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 190 (tracking the changing 
policy rationales for the BHCA since CEBA in response to the 
financial crisis and the enactment of Dodd-Frank). 
121 See id. at 174 (discussing the credit union exemption); see 
also id. at 179 (discussing the exemption for savings 
associations).  
122 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (codifying the exemptions to the 
definition of bank in the BHCA). 
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Though not explicitly stated, the rationale for these exemptions 
was, in part, due to the existence of a parallel regulatory 
regime.123  Credit unions are regulated and supervised by the 
National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), and thrift 
holding companies are regulated by the OCC (though, when the 
exemption was created, thrift holding companies were regulated 
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)).124  When 
considering whether our hypothetical marketplace lender, 
FastCash, should fall under the definition of a bank under the 
BHCA, we may also consider whether it is subject to a parallel 
federal regulatory regime.125 
Another implicit rationale for the applicability of the 
BHCA has to do with access to the federal safety net, i.e., 
 
123 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 178 (parallel regulatory regime 
for credit unions); see also id. at 190 (parallel regulatory 
regime for thrifts). 
124 See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the 
regulatory regime for thrifts by dissolving OTS and transferring 
authority to the OCC).  
125 See id. at 190 (discussing the importance of the policy 
rationales, including the existence of a parallel regulatory 
regime, to determining whether an entity should be subject to 
the requirements of the BHCA).  
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deposit insurance.126  This rationale can be thought of as an 
offshoot of the separation of banking and commerce.127  
Policymakers supported separating banking and commerce out of 
concerns that access to deposit insurance by commercial 
businesses would give them an unfair competitive advantage over 
businesses that have not acquired a deposit-taking bank.128  Part 
 
126 See id. at 152 n.146 (elaborating on the vulnerability of the 
federal safety net if purely commercial businesses were allowed 
to affiliate with banks). 
127 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 275–76 (expanding upon the 
risks posed to the deposit insurance fund by purely commercial 
businesses in the context of discussing underlying reasons for 
separating banking and commerce).  
128 See Jackson, supra note 81, at 14 (making the case against 
allowing the intermingling of banking and commerce because 
giving businesses access to cheap funding and “not funds 
obtained at higher competitive costs in less-regulated capital 
and credit markets” is generally anti-competitive); see also S. 
REP. NO. 100-19, at 7 (1987) (reporting that failing to close the 
nonbank bank loophole would undermine the separation of banking 
and commerce and undermine market competition); see also id. at 
8 (“The nonbank bank loophole allows commercial firms that own 
 
 43 
of the reason for closing the nonbank bank loophole in 1987 was 
to prevent “direct access to federally-insured retail deposits 
that served as a cheaper source of financing because of the 
public subsidy.”129  While access to such valuable funding is 
permissible for banks, who provide a public service, it is less 
necessary for commercial firms who are expected to rely on 
market forces for both funding and competition.130  We may also 
ask, therefore, whether our marketplace lender FastCash has 
access to the federal safety net such that it would give 
Abracadabra an unfair competitive advantage over other 
commercial firms.131 
Lastly, a more recent rationale has emerged following the 
financial crisis of 2008 and enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
 
nonbanks to gain an unfair competitive advantage over bank 
holding companies and over commercial firms that do not have 
captive nonbank banks.”). 
129 Omarova, supra note 8, at 152; see also S. REP. NO. 100-19 at 8 
(discussing Congress’ reasoning for closing the nonbank bank 
loophole).  
130 Contra Omarova, supra note 8, at 152 n.146. 
131 See, e.g., id. (discussing the implications of access to 
deposit insurance for commercial businesses who partner with 
depository institutions).  
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010:  safeguarding 
firms that are too big to fail.132  Dodd-Frank revolutionized 
financial stability regulation with the creation of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), whose ability to 
designate nonbank systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFIs”) gives the Board power that never existed under the 
BHCA; that is, oversight over nonbank institutions—institutions 
with no banking subsidiaries—such as insurance companies.133  
Under Dodd-Frank, firms designated as SIFIs by FSOC are subject 
to enhanced regulation by the Board and must maintain certain 
capital thresholds, among other requirements.134  While the FSOC 
regime is separate and apart from the BHCA, it adopts a similar 
 
132 See id. at 191 (noting how the Dodd-Frank financial stability 
regime functions as a backstop to the BHCA for firms not covered 
under the statute). 
133 See id. at 127 (explaining Dodd-Frank’s applicability to 
firms designated as SIFIs, even ones that do not own a bank, and 
how they would become subject to supervision and regulation by 
the Board much like BHCs).  
134 Id. 
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framework and applies it to firms designated as SIFIs.135  It is 
notable that Congress viewed safeguarding too-big-to-fail 
financial conglomerates as a key policy objective underlying a 
BHCA-like regulatory regime.136  
The concept behind the FSOC designation process was that 
financial firms could become so large that they pose a systemic 
risk to the entire financial system such that their failure is 
not an option (thus the moniker “too-big-to-fail”).137  FSOC 
initially showed promise, with some legal scholars positing that 
the new financial stability regime would make a strong BHCA less 
necessary.138  In other words, a BHC that is not subject to the 
 
135 See id. (contending that Dodd-Frank essentially adopted the 
BHCA regulatory regime and applied it to firms designated as 
SIFIs).  
136 See id. (noting the financial crisis made the once “obsolete” 
BHCA relevant again).  
137 See DAVID W. PERKINS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45518, BANKING 
POLICY ISSUES IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019) (discussing the concept 
of too-big-to-fail, stemming from the financial crisis of 2007-
2009).  
138 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 191 (arguing that the debate 
over the BHCA’s applicability will be much less vital following 
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BHCA due to the fact that it controls an exempt entity could 
still be subject to oversight by the Board if it is designated 
as a SIFI.139  Others questioned the effectiveness of Dodd-
Frank’s solution for resolving too-big-to-fail institutions.140  
At any rate, Dodd-Frank’s financial stability regime has since 
been rolled back.  The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2018 raised the threshold for SIFI 
 
Dodd-Frank and pointing out that the FSOC regime can also serve 
the same policy rationales that underlie the BHCA).  
139 See id. (making the point that a company not covered by the 
BHCA could still be subject to supervision by the Board in a 
BHCA-like manner under Dodd-Frank).  
140 See generally Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial 
Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO STATE 
L.J. 1087 (2015) (discussing the risks and inadequacies of an ex 
post approach to financial stability and financial crises, 
criticizing Dodd-Frank and FSOC); see generally Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act:  A Flawed and Inadequate Response 
to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011) 
(discussing the shortcomings of Dodd-Frank’s approach to too-
big-to-fail and the SIFI designation process).  
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designation to from $50 billion to $250 billion in assets.141  
Additionally, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced 
changes to FSOC’s designation guidelines that would make it 
harder to designate too-big-to-fail institutions as SIFIs.142  
Accepting the premise that FSOC would serve to complement the 
BHCA—and recognizing that there are no presently designated 
SIFIs—it appears that the BHCA will have to assume the role of 
safeguarding too-big-to-fail institutions going forward.143 
 
141 See Thomas W. Joo, Lehman 10 Years Later:  The Dodd-Frank 
Rollback, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 568 (2019) (discussing the 
changes that the 2018 legislation made to Dodd-Frank and FSOC’s 
SIFI designation process). 
142 See John W. Banes et al., FSOC Shift to an Activities-Based 
Approach Signals an Emphasis on the Risks to Financial Stability 
from Digital Transformation, DAVIS POLK (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2020-01-
15_fsoc_shift_to_activities-
based_approach_signals_emphasis_on_risks_from_digital_transforma
tion.pdf (summarizing the changes to the SIFI designation 
process under the 2019 guidance).  
143 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 191 (discussing the potential 
for FSOC to fill the shoes of the BHCA when it comes to too-big-
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B. Applying the Framework:  Marketplace Lending  
Having established a framework by which to analyze whether 
marketplace lenders should qualify as banks under the BHCA, we 
can now apply that framework to our hypothetical marketplace 
lender, FastCash.  The first rationale—restricting interstate 
banking—has faded away from the BHCA’s focus.144  Nonetheless, 
even if we were to consider whether defining FastCash as a bank 
under the BHCA would serve this rationale, FastCash offers 
lending services to its customers via an online platform only 
and does not have any branch locations.145  Even if Congress 
retained restricting interstate banking as a key policy 
 
to-fail institutions); see also John Heltman, Prudential, the 
Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018, 
9:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-
last-nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label (reporting on FSOC’s 
designation to remove Prudential’s SIFI designation, which was 
the last remaining SIFI).  
144 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 122–23 (“[S]afeguarding 
interstate banking restrictions faded away as the primary policy 
purpose behind the BHCA.”).  
145 See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 14, at 1 (describing 
marketplace lenders as online entities that do not provide 
services via a physical location). 
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objective for the BHCA, applying the definition of a bank to 
FastCash would not serve this rationale.146 
The second rationale, preventing the monopolization of 
commercial credit, stemmed from concerns by community bankers 
that they would be pushed out of the market by larger banking 
entities.147  While it remains a valid policy goal for the BHCA, 
the reality of the financial industry is that most banks have 
consolidated to form large financial conglomerates, hoarding a 
significant percentage of the commercial credit market.148  At 
any rate, our hypothetical marketplace lender FastCash makes 
consumer loans only, and the concentration of consumer credit 
 
146 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 122 (explaining that the 
restrictions in the BHCA against interstate banking arose as a 
result of banks forming BHC to avoid state laws in interstate 
branching).  
147 See id. (characterizing small independent and community 
bankers as the main thrust behind the BHCA due to fears of being 
overrun by large interstate banks).  
148 See id. at 124 (describing the allocation of commercial 
credit among large financial institutions versus small and 
medium-sized banks).  
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was not an issue that Congress was concerned about.149  But, say 
for example that FastCash wanted to expand into small business 
lending.150  FastCash’s share of the small business lending 
market would likely be relatively minor compared to the total 
amount of commercial credit.151  However, small business credit 
origination by marketplace lenders is growing rapidly, and there 
is reason to assume that FastCash will be competitive with other 
commercial lenders in the future.152  Additionally, it is likely 
that Abracadabra’s acquisition of FastCash could pose a risk to 
the concentration of commercial credit given that Abracadabra, a 
large e-commerce technology company, holds a substantial share 
 
149 See id. at 148 (explaining Congress’ focus on commercial 
loans as opposed to consumer loans).  
150 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the commercial 
lending activities of marketplace lenders). 
151 See id. (providing statistics on marketplace lenders’ 
consumer and small business credit, noting that marketplace 
lenders “accounted for less than 1% of the total consumer and 
small-business loan market”).  
152 See id. (emphasizing that marketplace lending is growing at a 
fast pace and noting the industry saw an increase of 163% in 
credit originations between 2011 and 2015).  
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of the market in the retail industry and thus has a large 
customer base.153  
We now turn to the question of whether defining FastCash as 
a bank under the BHCA would serve the separation of banking and 
commerce.154  The first prong of this rationale pertains to 
safety and soundness, specifically whether FastCash, as a 
national SPNB, is “too vital to be subject to the risks of other 
business activities.”155  It is unlikely that a small lender such 
as FastCash, even if acquired by a larger company like 
Abracadabra, would face systemic risks due to Abracadbra’s 
nonbanking businesses.156  However, Abracadabra’s use of big data 
could pose problems that might affect both its retail customers 
 
153 See, e.g. Khan, supra note 79, at 795 (analogizing the risks 
posed by Amazon in the antitrust sense to the intermingling of 
banking and commerce). 
154 See Omarova, supra note 7, at 123–24 (discussing the 
separation of banking and commerce). 
155 Khan, supra note 79, at 795. 
156 See id. at 795–96 (suggesting that Amazon’s expansion into 
financial services is unlikely to pose excessive financial 
risks). 
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and lending customers.157  Therefore, it would seem defining 
FastCash as a bank under the BHCA would serve the safety and 
soundness prong.  The second prong pertains to bias in credit 
underwriting, particularly whether FastCash would be more 
inclined to lend to Abracadabra to prop-up its failing 
nonbanking businesses.158  It would be very difficult to predict 
whether FastCash would be a good actor and conduct transactions 
with its affiliates at arms-length, but it is safe to assume 
that bias is a possibility.159  Lastly, the third prong relates 
to the potential for Abracadabra to form a large financial 
conglomerate.160  This is similarly difficult to predict but, 
 
157 See id. at 796 (using the 2013 Target hack as an example of 
the threat that large retailers pose because of their access to 
scores of consumer data).  
158 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276 (discussing bias as an 
issue with failing to separate banking and commerce).  
159 See Khan, supra note 79, at 795 (“Allowing a vertically 
integrated dominant platform [such as Amazon] to pick and choose 
to whom it makes its services available, and on what terms, has 
the potential to distort fair competition and the economy as a 
whole.”).  
160 See Omarova, supra note 82, at 276–77 (examining the risks of 
an excessive concentration of economic power). 
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nonetheless, a possibility.161  Along the same line, however, it 
is important to note the growing trend among Big Tech companies 
to expand into financial services.162  The “Big Four”—Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple—hold a large share of the market and 
thus have a large consumer base.163  Even though it is unclear 
whether this prong is satisfied, there is a sufficient 
possibility that the acquisition of marketplace lenders will 
form large financial conglomerates that subjecting FastCash to 
 
161 See Khan, supra note 79, at 796–97 (using Amazon as an 
example to suggest that allowing such companies to combine 
various lines of business could create an excessive 
concentration of economic power).  
162 See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Big Tech’s Invasion of Banking, MILKEN 
INST. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-
techs-invasion-of-banking (noting that commercial firms, such as 
“Amazon, Google, Alibaba and Tencent,” are entering the 
financial services world, threatening antitrust principles and 
the separation of banking and commerce, particularly because 
these companies have a large cache of resources and data). 
163 See id. (“[I]n light of its deep pockets and unprecedented 
access to data, big tech could prove the greater threat.”). 
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the definition of bank would seem to serve all three prongs and, 
therefore, the separation of banking and commerce.164 
Having discussed the explicit policy rationales, there 
appears to be a case for subjecting FastCash to the definition 
of a bank under the BHCA.165  There remain, however, the proposed 
implicit rationales, which might shed further light on whether 
FastCash should be a “bank.”166  The first implicit rationale is 
 
164 See Khan, supra note 79, at 796–97 (discussing the risks of 
consolidating economic power). 
165 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 119 (emphasizing the relevance 
of the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales); see also id. at 120 
(stating that the BHCA’s policy rationales have evolved over 
time as a result of changing conditions); see also id. 
(reiterating restricting interstate banking and the excessive 
concentration of commercial credit as underlying policy 
rationales for the BHCA).  
166 See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); see also id. at 
151–52 (pointing out that commercial companies who acquire banks 
also acquire cheap funding backed by depositors); see also id. 
at 127 (discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, nonbank systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) are regulated 
similarly to BHCs). 
 55 
the existence, or lack thereof, of a parallel regulatory 
regime.167  The credit union and thrift exemptions to the 
statutory definition of a bank were justified on the basis that 
credit unions were already regulated by the NCUA, while thrifts 
were already regulated by OTS, and subsequently the OCC.168  With 
marketplace lenders, there is no parallel regulatory regime at 
the national level.169 Marketplace lenders are primarily 
regulated by the states and may be regulated by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to the extent that consumer 
protection statutes are implicated.170  This tilts the balance in 
 
167 See id. at 178 (existence of a parallel regulatory regime for 
thrifts); see also id. at 190 (existence of a parallel 
regulatory regime for credit unions). 
168 See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the 
regulatory regime for thrifts by dissolving OTS and transferring 
authority to the OCC). 
169 See Perkins, supra note 14, at 12 (outlining the regulatory 
framework for the marketplace lending industry).  
170 See id. at 14–15 (discussing the consumer protection statutes 
that apply to marketplace lending).  
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favor of including marketplace lenders in the statutory 
definition of a bank.171   
However, recall that our hypothetical marketplace lender 
FastCash has received an SPNB charter from the OCC.172  
Therefore, a parallel regulatory regime would exist for FastCash 
at the federal level, but this is hardly dispositive.173  If 
being subject to regulation by the OCC weighed against BHCA 
applicability, then there would be no BHCA to begin with.  This 
is because the OCC has primary regulatory authority for all 
chartered national banks.174  The fact that FastCash as a SPNB 
would be regulated by the primary federal banking regulator does 
 
171 See id. at 16–17 (discussing the burdensome state regulatory 
system and lack of a national regulatory regime for marketplace 
lenders). 
172 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 4 
(discussing how FinTech SPNBs would be regulated by the OCC as 
national banks).  
173 See id. at 6 (“The OCC is the primary prudential regulator 
and supervisor of national banks.”).  
174 Id. 
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not mean that the BHCA should not apply.175  As a result, 
analyzing the parallel regulatory structure suggests that 
FastCash should be subject to the statutory definition of a 
bank.176 
The next implicit policy rationale pertains to whether 
FastCash has access to the federal safety net; specifically, 
whether Abracadabra would have access to funding subsidized by 
the public, obtaining an unfair competitive advantage.177  This 
 
175 See id. at 7 (acknowledging that national banks could be 
subject to regulation under the BHCA if the bank meets the 
statutory definition).  
176 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 186 n.327 (citing H.R. 10 - The 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 Hearings before the 
Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 106th Cong. 42-43 (1999) 
(statement of R. Scott Jones, President, American Bankers 
Association)) (noting thrift and bank holding companies are 
regulated differently, which is why the fact that a parallel 
regulatory system exists for thrifts was relevant to Congress’ 
decision to exempt thrifts from the definition of a bank under 
the BHCA). 
177 See id. at 152 (explaining that the issue with nonbank banks 
was there access to the federal safety net, giving them an 
unfair competitive advantage).  
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rationale need not be discussed further because subjecting 
FastCash to the BHCA clearly would not serve to protect the 
federal safety net.178  FastCash does not engage in any deposit-
taking business nor would it be able to because FinTech SPNBs 
are not permitted to take deposits.179  Without any insured 
deposits, FastCash and its acquisition by Abracadabra pose no 
threat to the federal safety net.180 
There appears to be a case in favor of subjecting FastCash 
to the statutory definition of a bank as doing so would serve 
the following three rationales:  (1) preventing the 
monopolization of commercial credit; (2) separation of banking 
and commerce; and (3) availability of a parallel regulatory 
regime.  The last rationale to consider is whether applying the 
 
178 See id. at 150 (noting that nonbank banks accepted insured 
deposits, which served as the exposure of risk to the federal 
safety net).  
179 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2 
(prohibiting depository institutions from applying for the 
FinTech charter).  
180 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 152 (pointing out that deposits 
serve as cheap source of funding because they are insured and 
backed by federal dollars). 
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statutory definition of a bank to FastCash would safeguard 
FastCash and its parent company as too-big-too-fail.181   
Because it is near impossible to predict with certainty 
whether Abracadabra will become too-big-to-fail, the primary 
argument weighing in favor of defining FastCash as a bank under 
the BHCA is the fact that the Dodd-Frank regime is no longer a 
fallback.182  In Dodd-Frank, Congress created FSOC with the 
intention of regulating large firms posing a systemic financial 
risk to the markets.183  Initially, it was unclear how effective 
FSOC would be, but it was expected that the exemptions from the 
BHCA definition of a bank would become less important in favor 
 
181 See id. at 191 (discussing the relevance of the FSOC regime 
to the BHCA).  
182 See Joo, supra note 141, at 568 (detailing how the Dodd-Frank 
regulatory regime and SIFI designation process have been rolled 
back under the Trump Administration); see also Banes, supra note 
142 (describing how the FSOC designation process has changed 
pursuant to the 2019 guidance).  
183 See Omarova, supra note 8, at 129 (discussing the BHCA-like 
regulatory regime that was enacted following the financial 
crisis).  
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of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.184  Because that has not 
happened, and the future of the Dodd-Frank regime remains 
uncertain, this weighs in favor of applying the statutory 
definition of a bank to FastCash and subjecting Abracadabra to 
the enhanced regulations of the BHCA.185 
IV. Recommendations for Applying the BHCA to FinTech SPNBs 
Given that the BHCA does not currently apply to FinTech 
SPNBs and having concluded that it should, this comment 
 
184 See id. (noting that the success of Dodd-Frank’s changes on 
financial stability and the regulation of too-big-to-fail 
institutions had not yet come to fruition); see also id. at 191 
(arguing that the distinctions in the definition of a bank under 
the BHCA matter less following the passage of Dodd-Frank because 
this new systemic regulatory regime was serving the same 
rationales underlying the BHCA but with broader applicability). 
185 See id. at 191 (suggesting that the Dodd-Frank regulatory 
regime might make it less likely that companies will try to 
avoid triggering the BHCA because of FSOC’s designation 
authority).  But see Complaint at 1, Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18 
Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019) 
(cautioning against enabling companies to obtain the benefits of 
a national bank charter because it would make them more likely 
to be too-big-to-fail).   
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recommends that Congress amend Section 2(c) of the BHCA to 
include FinTech SPNBs in the definition of a bank.186  Firstly, 
it must be noted that the OCC FinTech charter is still being 
litigated, and no FinTech company has yet applied for the 
charter.187  There are two ways by which the FinTech charter can 
become a legal certainty.  On the one hand, the Second Circuit 
could uphold the OCC’s authority to charter FinTech SPNBs, in 
which case, the charter proposal would move forward.188  On the 
 
186 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (setting out the seminal 
definition of a bank under the BHCA).  
187 Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 
6334895, at *1; see also Lacewell v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2d Cir. 
filed Dec. 19, 2019); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Lacewell, No. 18 
Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (noting that the OCC has not 
yet received any applications for a FinTech charter).  
188 See Glenn G. Lammi, State vs. Federal Clash Over National 
“Fintech Charter” Set For 2020 Appellate Showdown?, FORBES (Nov. 
14, 2019, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2019/11/14/state-vs-federal-
clash-over-national-fintech-charter-set-for-2020-appellate-
showdown/#34e43868757d (contending that the Second Circuit could 
uphold the OCC FinTech charter).  
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other hand, Congress could amend the National Bank Act and give 
the OCC the specific authority to charter FinTech SPNBs, similar 
to what it has done in the past for trust banks and bankers’ 
banks.189  Alternatively, however, it is possible that the OCC 
neither wins the Second Circuit case nor receives authority from 
Congress to charter FinTech SPNBs, and the potential for a 
FinTech national bank disappears for the time being.190  
Assuming the OCC’s ability to charter FinTech companies as 
national banks is valid, Congress should amend the BHCA in 
accordance with previous iterations to include FinTech SPNBs in 
the statutory definition of a bank.191  In 1982, Congress enacted 
the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, which provides 
 
189 See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (2018) (giving the OCC the authority to 
charter trust banks and bankers’ banks). 
190 See Sarah Grotta, Is This the End for the OCC Fintech 
Charter?, PAYMENTSJOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.paymentsjournal.com/is-this-the-end-for-the-occ-
fintech-charter/ (reporting on the OCC FinTech charter 
litigation). 
191 See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97–320, § 404, 96 Stat. 1496, 1511–12 (codified as 
amended in sections of 12 U.S.C.) (subjecting bankers’ banks to 
the definition of a bank under the BHCA). 
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a framework that Congress can replicate to apply the BHCA 
definition of a bank to FinTech SPNBs.192  Title IV of the Garn-
St Germain Act introduced the concept of “bankers’ banks,” that 
is, banks that are owned “exclusively . . . by other depository 
institutions” and are engaged in “providing services for other 
depository institutions and their officers, directors, and 
employees.”193  Under the 1970 version of the BHCA, bankers’ 
banks did not meet the statutory definition of a bank.194 
Consequently, in the Garn-St Germain Act, Congress amended the 
BHCA to provide that: 
The term ‘bank’ also includes a State chartered bank 
or a national banking association which is owned 
exclusively (except to the extent directors’ 
qualifying shares are required by law) by other 
depository institutions or by a bank holding company 
which is owned exclusively by other depository 
institutions and is organized to engage exclusively in 
 
192 Id. 
193 See id. (giving the OCC the authority to charter bankers’ 
banks and amended the BHCA to include bankers’ banks in the 
definition of a bank); 12 U.S.C. § 27 (2018) (codifying the 
OCC’s authority charter bankers’ banks and defining a bankers’ 
bank).  
194 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970).  
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providing services for other depository institutions 
and their officers, directors, and employees.195 
 
 While this provision has been effectively repealed because 
it is no longer necessary under the 1987 statutory definition of 
a bank, the Garn-St Germain Act provides a useful roadmap for 
how Congress can close the BHCA loophole in the OCC FinTech 
charter.196  This comment recommends that Congress append a 
subsection to Section 2(c)(1) of the BHCA providing that the 
term “bank” also includes institutions chartered as SPNBs 
pursuant to the OCC FinTech charter.197 
The Garn-St Germain Act also exempted bankers’ banks from 
the requirement that every bank subsidiary of a holding company 
be an insured bank as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act (“FDIA”).198   With FinTech SPNBs who, by definition, do not 
and cannot take deposits, the Garn-St Germain Act appears to be 
 
195 § 404(d), 96 Stat. 1512. 
196 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–86, 
§ 101, 101 Stat. 552, 554–564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841); 
U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018). 
197 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (containing the statutory 
definition of a bank under the BHCA). 
198 § 404(d)(2), 96 Stat. 1512 (exempting bankers’ banks from 
BHCA deposit insurance requirements). 
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the optimal model for Congress to subject companies with control 
over FinTech SPNBs to the requirements of the BCHA without also 
implicating the requirements for deposit insurance.199 
V. Conclusion 
As Big Tech makes its way into financial services, U.S. 
regulators will need to grapple with the reality that the 
current legal framework is ill-equipped to deal with this entry.  
This comment proposes an analysis framework that is flexible and 
will necessarily evolve over time in order to determine whether 
an entity should be subject to the requirements of the BHCA.  An 
analysis of the BHCA’s underlying policy rationales reveals that 
marketplace lenders should be included in the statutory 
definition of a bank.  Congress can do this by amending the 
definition under Section 2(c) of the BHCA to include SPNBs 
chartered pursuant to the OCC FinTech charter.  Doing so would 
ensure that Big Tech companies and others could not use the 
charter as a form of regulatory arbitrage by circumventing the 
enhanced requirements under the BHCA.   
 
199 See § 404, 96 Stat. 1512 (amending the BHCA with respect to 
bankers’ banks).  
